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 Introduction 
 
This paper focuses on Trade-Related Technical Assistance (TRTA) provided by the 
European Union to the Africa Caribbean Pacific (ACP) countries and other Least 
Developed Countries (LDCs). The context is the centrality of the development dimension 
in the current Doha Development Round and negotiation of Economic Partnership 
Agreements (EPAs) with regional groupings of ACP countries. These countries are 
challenged to elaborate their trade-related development agendas in the negotiations and 
the EU has to ensure that its support generates quantitative and qualitative results. 
Following an approach rooted in institutional theory, donor-driven TRTA is itself 
considered as an important part of the institutional framework with its own rules and 
constraints. The analysis of actual EU TRTA, building on the emergent literature, also 
takes into consideration country case studies and experience ‘in progress’ from a cluster 
of ‘all ACP’ TRTA programmes. From this some conclusions are drawn. The approach is 
less concerned with the debates around the key issues in the current Doha Development 
Round (DDR) and EPAs – market access, tariff and quota liberalization, adjustment and 
compensation – than how TRTA can best strengthen developing countries’ institutional 
capacity in trade so that they meet the challenges posed by the rule-based multilateral 
trading system and alleviate poverty. In the main, while there are emerging good 
practices and successes, it is concluded that enhanced institutional coherency will impact 
positively on the quality and results of TRTA. 
 
Trade capacity building can be narrowly defined as a process by which individuals, 
groups and organizations enhance their abilities to perform tasks, solve problems and 
both set and achieve objectives in the field of trade and trade-related policy making and 
implementation. A broader definition includes the institutional settings – organizational 
structures, the legal system, governance, civil society organizations, private sector 
intermediary organizations and public-private consultative structures. The available 
literature on the results of donor-funded programs suggests that there are major 
bottlenecks in multilateral, intra-governmental, intra-regional and public-private 
communication processes as well as individual and organizational competence. 
Consideration of competence factors needs to include analysis of the capabilities and 
actual activities of providers of TRTA including, for example, whether their interventions 
have resulted in lasting improvements. Donors and government authorities have tended to 
focus their resources and capacity building activities on government ministries, 
regulating and enforcement authorities, regional integration organizations, private sector 
associations, civil society representatives and universities, but results seem to have been 
variable. It is, for example, uncertain that there are effective processes of trade policy 
formulation dialogue in many developing countries.  
 
An institutional approach 
 
The core argument of this paper is that institutions do indeed matter and TRTA, in order 
to be effective, needs to be designed within the institutional framework that will shape 
the direction of new knowledge and skills. An institutional approach to TRTA further 
entails understanding the dynamics and processes of institutional change. Following Douglass North’s path finding work on political economy, the institutional framework 
comprises formal rules, informal constraints (norms, beliefs, routines, conventions, 
customs, taboos) and their enforcement characteristics; it shapes the development of 
organizations and the acquisition of knowledge and skills. Institutional change entails 
changing the incentive structure, including monetary rewards, rewards for acquiring 
knowledge, tolerance for development and the utility of research (North 1990). 
According to North, changing the incentive structure has been the major tool by which 
humans have attempted deliberately to alter their environment and encompasses many of 
the efforts in the contemporary world to improve the performance of third world 
economies. Yet institutional change is not a linear process and could involve trial and 
error: there are institutions that reward crime and restrictions on output just as there are 
institutions that reward productive endeavour and lower transaction costs.  
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The model above represents a development of institutional theory into a formulation of 
‘institutional capacity in trade policy’. The key institutions include: the international 
regulatory regimes and legal implementation rules; trade and economic policy; regional 
integration and regional integration organizations (RIOs); civil society, public-private 
dialogue and consultation structures and technological innovation. In North’s terms, these 
are the ‘formal rules’, but institutional analysis needs to incorporate the ‘informal 
constraints’ – the socio-cultural norms and values in society. The working model is 
intended to show the connections between institutional capacity building and trade. 
Discussion on these concepts leads to a more nuanced understanding of trade capacity 
building that encapsulates not only education, training and other forms of human resource 
development, but also the institutional settings and informal constraints. Trade capacity building can be narrowly defined as a process by which individuals, groups and 
organizations enhance their abilities to perform tasks, solve problems and both set and 
achieve objectives in the field of trade and trade-related policy making and 
implementation. A broader concept of institutional capacity building entails not only 
strengthening and supporting the organizations and institutions that matter in trade, but 
also, for example, developing institutional linkages that create effective evidence-based 
negotiation strategies. This includes creating incentives for learning to take place and 
nurturing educational and research organizations that will sustain institutional capacity. 
The two very different developing country case studies, from the Republic of Yemen and 
the Kingdom of Swaziland, serve to highlight the need for an integrated institutional 
approach to building trade capacity. 
 
The Republic of Yemen 
 
The importance of institutions in trade policymaking has been underlined by, for 
example, the Integrated Framework’s ‘Diagnostic Trade Integration Studies’. The 
Diagnostic Trade Integration Study (DTIS) for the Republic of Yemen is a case in point. 
The Yemen DTIS addresses trade-related topics and attempts to locate proposals for 
technical assistance within the institutional settings. Concerning trade facilitation, 
institutional obstacles reflecting overlap of government functions are identified. These 
include unnecessary inspection at the border and at roadside by agencies of government 
with different mandates – customs, security and standards. The report further refers to 
problems created by “the ambiguities flowing from decentralization about who should do 
what” (2003 : 73). The ambiguities, arguably, relate both to formal rules such as property 
rights and informal constraints or cultural traditions that are nested in Yemen’s complex 
social structure characterized by delicate power relations between tribal leaders and 
central and local government. Changes in the formal rules such as customs reform can 
face ‘difficulties of sustainability’ in the face of deep rooted informal constraints. An 
underlined point In the Yemen DTIS is that “Yemen’s needs not WTO requirements 
(should) set the order for institution building.” (2003 : 63).  This may be implicit 
acknowledgement that institutional path dependency acts as a powerful constraint to 
accommodating international rules and standards. Yemen provides a challenging case for 
institutional capacity building and the issue of a very country-specific approach based on 
overriding poverty alleviation objectives merits deeper consideration. 
 
The Kingdom of Swaziland 
 
As a small landlocked county in the SADC grouping, Swaziland provides an interesting 
case study. Gitonga (2007), noting a lack of institutional coherency in the process of trade 
policy making, has argued for a national approach involving all relevant actors, public 
private and civil society. This includes important organizations such as the Swaziland 
Sugar Association, representative of a highly sensitive and important sector, as well as 
civil society organizations. The table below shows the institutional difficulties in trade 
policy making, even without taking into account the regional dimension, in the case of a 
small country like Swaziland. 
 
  Table 1. Key Trade Policy Making Organizations in Swaziland 
 
Organization  ROLE IN TRADE POLICY 
FORMULATION 
KEY AID FOR TRADE 
CATEGORY 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade 
•  National Export Strategy. 
•  WTO Trade Policy Review 
•  WTO, COMESA,SADC, 
EPAs, AGOA 
•  Responsible for SACU 
National Body (trade remedies, 
tariff administration) 
Trade policy formulation and 
regulation 
Trade development 
Ministry of Enterprise and 
Employment 
•  Responsible for enterprise, 
industry and employment, 
competition, unfair trade remedies 
Trade development 
Ministry of Finance  •  Responsible for the SACU 
Common Revenue Pool which 
provides over 50% of Government 
•  Customs 
Infrastructure 
Ministry of Agriculture  •  Responsible for all agriculture 
related issues in the country. 
Productive capacity 
Ministry of Economic 
Planning and Development 
•  Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Paper 
•  National Development Strategy 
•  Millennium Development 
Goals 
•  National Aid Policy 
•  National Adaptation Strategy 
Adjustment 
Source: Gitonga (2007) 
 
While efforts are being made to improve coordination, not only among different aspects 
of trade policy but also among the political and economic actors involved domestically, 
constraints do remain, not least a lack of national coherency and a lack of knowledge 
detrimental to Swaziland’s participation in SADC and the EPA negotiations. 
Encouragingly, a national Negotiating Forum consisting of Government, business and 
civil society, has been set up to facilitate the coordinating process. A serious need 
remains, however, for a deeper level of understanding and participation in the WTO and 
EPA negotiations by all sectors and players in the economy.  According to Gitonga, the 
approach should ideally lead to a focused capacity building intervention at a national 
level, rather than the piecemeal participation of a few officials in regional workshops 
which tend to omit civil society, private sector, academia, parliamentarians and other 
economic players in the country.  
 
Critical Perspectives on donor-funded TRTA 
 
International development aid has been driven by overarching objectives of institutional 
development and poverty alleviation in developing countries but, prominent writers have 
expressed doubts about the incentives for learning that have been created. For example, 
Fukuyama (2004) has described an inherent contradiction in donor policy in that donors 
want both to increase the beneficiary government’s capacity to provide a particular 
service, and to actually provide those services to end users. He argues that “the latter objective almost always wins out because of the incentives facing the donors themselves. 
While many donors believe they can work toward both goals simultaneously, in practice 
the direct provision of services almost always undermines the local government’s 
capacity to provide them once the aid program terminates” (2004 : 54).   
 
More recently, Drezner (2007) has argued that powerful states – especially the great 
powers – still dominate international regulatory regimes and that these regulatory goals 
are driven by their domestic interests. In the case of TRIPS and public health, for 
example, Drezner has shown that, although the global civil society achieved significant 
gains public health “gains” concerning the availability of ARV treatment for HIV/AIDS 
treatment, in fact the United States used the public health arguments “to argue in favour 
of more stringent Intellectual Property Rights protections post-Doha” (2007: 202). In 
TRTA, northern development specialists are frequently up against “conflicts of interests” 
arguments that are given credence by a skewing towards projects aimed at enforcing legal 
compliance and strengthening public administration. The essence of these views, focused 
on the dynamics of global development, is that it is the institutional framework, including 
the competitive interests of powerful member states, of the donor communities and 
multilateral institutions such as the EU, shape the emerging institutions in ACP countries.   
 
International development aid, or more particularly TRTA and capacity building, is 
frequently aimed at building or changing institutions in developing countries. As 
institutional theorists suggest, this could take the form of transplanting developing 
countries’ institutions into the developing world. An additional strand of global 
development criticism has emerged in recent work by Easterly (2006), in particular and 
Calderisi (2006), former senior World Bank officials. While calling into question the 
institution of development itself and the culture that has developed around it, they 
criticise methods, practices, efficiency and effectiveness. Easterly (2006), notably 
characterizes much development aid as centralized bureaucratic planning rather than 
bottom-up searching for positive local initiatives to support. Notwithstanding the 
sensational aspects of exposés by former insiders, Easterly’s distinction between planning 
and searching is useful in TRTA, especially with regard to trade and development: the 
promotion of entrepreneurship, private sector development and public-private dialogue 
by ‘searching for and encouraging promising local initiatives’ can ultimately strengthen a 
country’s trade capacity and inform its trade policy.  
 
This paper builds, particularly, on recent studies by te Velde (2006), Saner and Paez 
(2006) and Prowse (2005). In a critical assessment of the EU’s trade-related technical 
assistance to third countries, te Velde found that apart from weak capacity in developing 
countries’ trade ministries, the main problems centred on programming and budgeting 
difficulties, particularly concerning discrepancies’ between numbers committed and 
numbers disbursed and time lags between completion of country strategy papers and 
implementation. The author has commented on the lack of political ownership of TRTA 
programmes of support in host developing countries and lack of transparency in the way 
projects are selected; instead, TRTA tends to reflect the interests of the agencies 
providing the support. They have argued that TRTA is incorrectly based on diagnostic 
trade studies, notably the Integrated Framework.  In common with other analysts, a lack of qualitative and descriptive analytical information on the results of TRTA actions has 
been noted.   
 
Saner and Paez (2006) have discerned major shortcomings in their critical assessment 
that is largely focused on the working of the Integrated Framework launched in October 
1997 as a coordinated response to the growing complexity of Least Developed Countries’ 
(LDCs’) trade-related problems. Six multilateral institutions, IMF, ITC, UNCTAD, 
UNDP, World Bank and the WTO, have pooled resources to deliver enhanced benefits to 
LDCs within the multilateral trading system. The implementation of the IF comprises 
three broad stages: first; an initial request to participate and preparatory activity; second, 
the elaboration of a Diagnostic Trade Integration Study (DTIS); and finally, the 
translation of the diagnostic study’s findings into the elaboration and validation of an 
action plan. To date, 40 LDCs are in different stages of the IF process. In 2005, the 
decision was taken at a Development Committee meeting of the World Bank and IMF to 
enhance the working of the Integrated Framework. The fundamental development issues 
for the IF is to mainstream trade into development and poverty reduction in LDCs and in 
so doing create conditions to ensure that increased trade benefits the poor. 
 
Saner and Paez found that there is a budgetary constraint that has affected the speed and 
comprehensiveness of implementation of TRTA via the IF. Second, it is very difficult to 
mobilize additional resources for capacity building and far less had been disbursed than 
actually pledged. The third concern relates to conditionality, including the requirement 
for LDCs to complete a DTIS. Although this seems necessary, in practice the process is 
lengthy and cumbersome. Various stakeholders, including donor agencies and 
governments need to approve and special capacities are required of LDCs just to qualify 
for TRTA. The fourth problem is the IF’s limited impact and comprehensiveness when 
compared to its original purpose and objectives. Tellingly, only 14 out of 50 recognized 
LDCs have received aid under the second round of the IF. The conclusion arrived at by 
Saner and Paez is either that the objectives of the IF are too ambitious or that the ability 
of LDCs to respond with more enabling trade environments has been overestimated by 
the IF institutions (2006: 476).  
 
The critical views considered above either treat the aid business as a flawed global 
development system or consider the efficiency and effectiveness of the TRTA aid 
mechanisms themselves. Both approaches are informative, but do not go far enough. A 
third approach based on institutional analysis may be discerned. An example of this 
approach has been provided by Stevens (2007), who has described EU ‘aid for trade’ as 
institutionally incoherent for reasons that include the following: three different policies 
(Everything But Arms, Most Favoured Nation and General System of Preferences+) exist 
for different developing countries; there is some degree of overlap between two 
Directorates concerned with aid for trade, namely Europaid and DGTrade; and the 26 
different decision making centres in the EU create problems in negotiations and policy 
making. For example, the Trade and Development Cooperation Agreement with South 
Africa in 2000 has yet to be finally agreed due to some EU member states’ refusal to 
accept certain provisions. In the case of a number of trade-related programmes in the 
ACP, the ACP secretariat in Brussels comprises another element of the institutional decision making architecture. Further, member states may provide their own bilateral aid 
for trade.  
 
Stiglitz and Charlton (2005) question the actual targeting and prioritization of 
intervention. They argue that “easing supply constraints requires a broader interpretation 
of the responsibilities covered by technical assistance and more than bolstering public 
institutions. While public sector capacity building is an important objective, it is not a 
substitute for programs to enhance the capacity of the private sector to develop into new 
markets” (2005: 209) Key focal points for TRTA could be export finance, access to credit 
and transport infrastructure. Notwithstanding any emerging consensus on the TRTA 
continuing doubts exist about excessive bureaucracy, budgetary constraints, unfair donor 
conditionalities and disbursement-procedural problems. The targeting of TRTA on the 
‘supply side, includes the complementary behind-the-border institutional and social 
structures that not only facilitate trade and economic convergence, but also drive 
sustainable growth. If it is going to succeed, according to these writers, funds and human 
resources need to be mobilized swiftly. The crucial assumption seems to be that LDCs 
have the means and capacities to articulate their needs with strict demand-driven 
implementation approach. This is not the case in all cases, especially a significant number 
of poor countries falling into the LDC category. 
 
The Integrated Framework: a sound basis for institution building?  
 
An evaluation of the revamped IF in November 2003 noted the fundamental soundness of 
the approach, but specified that fine-tuning would be necessary to move to a robust 
implementation phase. The evaluation report distinguished between micro and macro 
fine-tuning issues. In macro terms, it is argued, trade will only benefit the poor in an 
LDC, if governance provides for political inclusiveness and greater social development. 
In micro-terms, the evaluators called for a pro-poor policy environment and an 
integration of trade-related issues into Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) early in 
the introduction of an IF to an LDC.  The final evaluation issue related to mainstreaming 
of trade and development with concerns being raised by the participatory environment in 
some LDCs, which need to be strengthened.  
 
Prowse (2005) contends that despite the value of mainstreaming trade into national 
development strategies and Poverty Strategy Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), the IF’s 
mandate remains largely unfulfilled. Current levels of assistance aimed at helping 
developing countries integrate into the global trading system are inadequate and require 
additional support to build sustainable capacity would help countries implement 
multiyear programmes of policy reform, trade related-activities, and investment, 
including private sector investment in the context of the PSRP. A strengthened Integrated 
Framework developed within the context of countries’ PRSPs would provide a clear 
framework on adjustment costs, trade facilitation needs, trade-related infrastructure 
investment, and institutional reform programmes that would help eliminate bottlenecks 
and expand trade.” (2005: 259) The basis of Prowse’s ‘aid for trade’ model is an 
improved IF that aims to bolster in-country institutional capacity, but is not only confined 
to the relevant Government ministries dealing with trade-related issues. Her implementation model effectively contextualises ‘aid for trade’ in a broader context of 
policy reform, including industrial policy and development strategy as put forward in 
PRSPs. A rigorous needs identification process is a necessary pre-requirement for an 
effective demand-driven donor ‘aid for trade’ agenda. A DTIS and/or needs analysis, 
provided it has a political ownership, therefore is a priori the base for determining the 
right mix of TRTA projects and activities. The important issues concern whether or not 
the main needs in a country’s institutional trade capacity have been correctly identified as 
indicated by both the official country ownership and the follow up on the key 
recommendations by donors.  
 
Table 2. Trade-Related Assistance by the European Commission, by category (€ 
million) 
 
  2001  2002  2003  2004  Total 
2001-
2004 
 
2005 
 
 
Trade Policy and Regulations 
  
270.7 259.7  363.1  229.5  1122.4  355.0 
Trade Mainstreaming in 
PRSPs/Development Plans 
0.0 8.6  22.7  22.6  53.9  86.2 
Technical and Sanitary Standards  83.3  14.5  48.7  17.8  164.3  53.2 
Trade Facilitation  60.0  59.1  179.4  117.7  416.2  21.5 
Regional Trade Agreements  56.4  122.5  92.8  42.7  314.4  182.5 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations  71.0  54.4  8.6  28.3  162.3  10.0 
Trade Education and Training  0.0  0.0  10.9  0.4  11.3  1.6 
            
Trade and Development  555.1 429.1  526.1  711.1  2221.4  349.9 
Business Support Services and Institutions  296.4  231.9  205.1  180.6  914.0  98.6 
Banking and Financial Services  157.5  122.5  135.4  134.8  552.7  125.0 
Trade Promotion and Market Development  59.2  48.3  47.8  31.6  186.9  0.0 
- Agriculture             
- Fishing  32.3  0.0  19.0  3.6  54.9  0.0 
- Mineral Resources and Forestry  3.0  0.0  0.0  1.0  4.0  0.0 
- Industry  0.0  0.0  49.4  103.5  152.9  88.9 
- Tourism  6.0  8.9  0.4  0.0  15.3  2.5 
- Services  0.7  15.0  8.0  31.0  54.7  0.0 
- General/Multisector  0.0  0.0  61.0  225.0  286.0  34.9 
Total above Category 1 and 2  825.8   688.2  889.2  940.6  3343.8  704.9 
 
Trade Related Infrastructure 
 
1142 
 
1653 1137 1414     
Source: WTO data base 
 
On the surface, EU TRTA is committed to ‘Trade and Development’ to a greater extent 
than ‘Trade Policy and Regulations.’ All ACP programmes such as Pro€invest, Bizclim 
and other sectoral projects are aimed at strengthening agriculture, industry and business 
in ACP countries. These horizontal all ACP programmes are amongst the most ambitious 
TRTA programmes and worth about € 2bn. Specific trade-related programmes are 
summarised in the table below.   
Table 3. All ACP horizontal programmes 
Project Purpose  Amount 
Pro€invest  The objective is to promote investment and 
technology flows to enterprises operating 
within key sectors in the ACP States. This will 
be achieved through a two dimensional 
approach: to support intermediary 
organisations and professional associations 
and to develop inter-enterprise partnerships. 
€ 110 m 
EU – ACP EPA support  The purpose is to ensure that the ACP States 
are well prepared to conduct the negotiations 
on EPAs. The Programme is targeted to ACP 
governments, ACP regional economic 
groupings, regional organizations, the private 
sector and civil society organizations.  
€ 20 m 
Trade.com (incl. hubs and spokes)  Provides trade-related technical assistance to  
ACP countries. This falls under of 3 
components:  trade policy formulation, 
assistance in the preparation and conduct of 
EPA negotiations and assistance in the 
implementation of the international legal 
framework (WTO). 
€ 50 m 
WTO MTS integration  Provides TRTA to ACP States, regions and 
non state actors. The priority areas of support 
are: multilateral Negotiations, implementation 
of WTO Agreements and accession to the 
WTO.   
€ 12 m 
BizClim  Aims at enhancing the business climate in 
ACP countries; it seeks to facilitate state-
owned enterprise reform, public-private 
partnerships, financial sector development as 
well as supporting macroeconomic stability 
through its activities and the support provided 
by the donor community. 
€ 20 m 
 
The all ACP projects are intended to be demand-driven. Programme Management Units 
(PMUs) shave to guide and steer requests into well-designed projects in accordance with 
the overarching project purpose and objectives. The experience thus far suggests that the 
demand-driven approach is principled and correct, but in practice many of the weaker 
ACP countries lack the capacity to articulate the demand. Weak institutions, a lack of 
qualified staff, inadequate trade policy and understanding of real trade interests are all 
institutional constraints that demand-driven aid providers have had to find ways of 
addressing. Project staff members conduct promotional campaigns, but hands-on 
assistance is frequently required in formulating requests. In contrast, stronger ACP 
countries have fewer problems and are able to take advantage of the TRTA opportunities 
that exist. Without well-balanced promotional campaigns and proactive assistance to 
more disadvantaged countries, a strict demand-driven approach arguably may contribute 
to trade diversion.  In theory, the DTIS should provide the guiding contextual framework 
for projects, but meeting expenditure targets and reacting to immediate needs would 
appear to the main drivers. 
 All ACP projects have complex governance and reporting structures. Project 
Management Units (PMUs) may report to the ACP secretariat as well as both Europaid, 
DG Trade and Steering Committees that include representatives of regional integration 
organizations in complex principal–agent structural arrangements. Steering Committees 
approve work programmes and give overall direction to activities biannually. Managing 
conflicting interests and agendas and creating institutional coherency requires 
considerable skill on the part of the TRTA managers, including not only trade-related 
technical competence, but also political, interpersonal and socio-cultural acumen and 
knowledge. Specialist knowledge of EDF procurement and disbursement procedures is a 
further necessary requirement. In certain cases, procedures can be constraints: for 
example, an all ACP project with a six year time span is managed on the basis of annual 
estimates and approved work programmes, but timely interventions of urgent need are 
contingent on a fast approval cycle and disbursement of funds. If disbursements are slow, 
then the relative flexibility of funding instruments can be negated. The experience of this 
is mixed, but evidence suggests that the EUACPEPA project, for example, has been quite 
successful in being able to provide prompt support to ACP countries efforts to prepare for 
EPA negotiations. In addition, PMUs have to carefully steward available funds within the 
constraints imposed by the tight calendar of an annual work programme. In the current 
EU-ACP EPA negotiations needs are frequently short term and urgent; data and analysis 
are needed to inform evidence-based negotiating positions.  
 
 Increasing evidence, based on recent constructive collaboration between the different all 
ACP programmes, suggests that there is much to be gained from improved coordination 
between different EU projects and instruments. Programmes such as Pro€invest are well-
suited to longer term behind the border supply side development while the Trade.com 
Facility provides short term technical assistance that can kick start promising local 
initiatives and dovetail with resources provided by Delegations and other country-specific 
programmes. Arguably, effective coordination can counteract programming, 
disbursement and timing difficulties.  This viewpoint is buttressed by a need for balance 
in supporting urgent short term needs and sustaining long term capacity building. The 
available evidence (table 2) shows that limited funds have been provided to support 
trade-related education and training. Bachelors and Masters programmes as well as short 
term issue-specific training courses can ensure a supply of well-qualified trade 
professionals who are needed for under-resourced and under-skilled trade ministries. As a 
case in point, the ‘hubs and spokes’ programme – a component of the Trade.com 
programme – has a recruited a number of graduates from Trade Masters programmes in 
the Caribbean region and South Africa. Long term TRTA in selected key universities 
across regions can expand the critical mass of trade professionals in the ACP.  
 
Education is more focused on trade-related knowledge, whereas training is more 
concerned with shorter term technical knowledge, such as on SPS and rules of origin; and 
skills, such as the ability to negotiate effectively. Both are fundamental elements of 
learning or ‘sustainable skills and knowledge transfer’ that should be an intended and 
actual outcome in all capacity building projects and interventions. Training includes on-
the-job training, coaching and mentoring that need to be incorporated as learning 
outcomes in project designs. The question is perhaps not whether there should be more trade-related education and training projects, but whether education and training should 
be built into all projects and technical assistance assignments. The duration of learning-
oriented technical assistance would naturally vary from country to country as developing 
countries, even within the LDC categorization, are not homogeneous. Weak educational 
institutions, for example, may require a more sustained period of technical assistance, 
including institutional twinning arrangements and the establishment of collaborative 
research networks. 
 
In assessing EU-supported TRTA te Velde (2006), described the conflict of interests that 
underlies the EU’s technical and financial assistance to their EPA negotiation 
counterparts. The emerging evidence suggests that there is some lack of trust towards 
trade experts who are also EU Nationals advising ACP trade negotiators, although this is 
by no means universal. In some cases, ACP Governments have specifically requested that 
technical assistance should be delivered by local or ACP experts rather than EU 
consultants. Given the dilemmas posed by a perceived conflict of interests, this would be 
natural development. However, more ACP trade experts and professionals are certainly 
needed to meet the needs for specialized advice on trade policy, trade law, economic 
analysis and negotiations.  Effective universities, research and training organizations are 
vital institutional settings for building capacity in trade. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Institutional coherency is lacking 
 
Improved institutional coherency is a need on both sides of the development divide. A 
finely tuned approach based on systemic institutional capacity building will ensure that 
TRTA is not ad hoc, piecemeal or entirely ‘driven by numbers’ as is often the case. 
Institutional reform on the side of the EU is more complex given the EU’s institutional 
structure. There is a need, however, to build on the increasingly constructive 
collaboration between ‘all ACP’ TRTA programmes and EU Delegations. As ever, donor 
coordination, harmonization and correct priority identification are essential. 
 
 Efficiency and effectiveness in design and implementation are equally important 
 
EU supported TRTA is “doing many of the right things”, particularly concerning trade 
development, even if, in terms of recurring criticism in the literature on slow bureaucratic 
procedures and disbursement, it may not be “doing all things right.”  The ongoing need is 
to ensure that TRTA and aid for trade reaches beneficiaries in a timely and efficient 
manner. 
 
The IF can be improved, but remains the vital institution building coordination 
mechanism 
 
The main weakness in the IF is that donor activities are not coordinated at an early stage 
within the needs matrix. Criticism of the IF focuses largely on the failure to achieve its 
original objectives and procedural-administrative problems, not on the fundamental soundness of the concept. In the context of institutional incoherency and a burgeoning of 
donor TRTA and aid for trade initiatives, efficiently-coordinated, effective and high 
quality DTIS studies should be providing the ‘institutional glue’. There are few other 
realistic alternatives. 
 
Creating learning is central to all TRTA  
 
Providers of TRTA have to ensure that learning takes place in such a way as to promote 
institutional development and change. Learning is not only formal training and education, 
but also includes coaching, mentoring, on-the-job training, e-learning, action learning and 
informal education.  Support to well-designed short and long educational and training 
programmes as well as to research organizations in ACP universities and other 
educational organizations, can help to create a platform for building sustainable 
institutional capacity. This will of course over time diminish dependency on advisors and 
organizations from developed countries. 
 
A  competency based approach is required for TRTA  practitioners 
 
On the side of multilateral donors, project cycle management (PCM) has tended to 
emphasize quantitative outputs such as ‘numbers of persons’ trained.’ On one level, this 
encourages results-orientated implementation, but deeper consideration should be given 
to the lasting ‘sustainable’ results. It is also imperative that designers and providers –
contractors and consultants – of TRTA do not only emphasize the learning factors as well 
as the technical inputs. The suite of competencies required of TRTA practitioners should 
not be limited to trade-related categories. Consultants and technical experts have to be 
‘engineers of the learning environment’ with systems thinking skills and an ability to 
contextualize their inputs.  
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